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OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DARRELL EUGENE HEATH,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Case No.
12610

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
On the 12th day of April, 1971, the
appellant was charged with the crime of grand
larceny in connection with the alleged theft

of one 1965 Mercury Cornet automobile, belonging to Lillian Hales and Larry Hales.

The

appellant was subsequently bound over to the
Fourth District Court to stand trial for the
accused crime.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial held on the 27th day of

May, 1971, the jury found the appellant
guilty of grand larceny as charged in the
complaint.

This is an appeal from that

conviction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the lower
court's judgment and his resulting conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 12th day of April,
1971, Lillian Hales was the registered owner
of a 1965 Comet two-door hardtop automobile,
white in color (Tr. 12-13, 22, 30).

The

principal user of the vehicle was her son,
Larry Hales

(Tr. 17), and it was the said

Larry Hales who had in fact paid for the
vehicle.

(Tr. 22,24).

The vehicle was pur-

chased in May, 1969, for approximately $1,100.00
(Tr. 13,29) and was sold on or about the 15th
day of April, 1971, for $300. 00.

(Tr. 16, 28).

Larry Hales also received the proceeds of the

sale

(Tr. 20,28).
On the evening of April 11, 1971, the

1965 Cornet was parked in front of the Hales
residence located at 57 North 6th East in
Spanish Fork, Utah

(Tr. 19,28).

The record

is not clear, however, when the car was last
seen that evening.

On the morning of April

12, 1971, sometime between the hours of 5:00
o'clock and 5:30 o'clock a.m., Lillian Hales
and Duane Hales, her husband, were awakened
by the sound of a motor starting (Tr. 12,21-22).
Both Mr. and Mrs. Hales looked out the window
and saw what appeared to be the 1965 Comet
belonging to Mrs. Hales driving North on 6th
East street (Tr. 12,22).

They did not actually

see the auto leave from in front of the house
nor could they make any identification of the
person driving the vehicle (Tr. 19,24). In fact,

Mrs. Hales could not even make an absolute
Positive identification that the car she saw
~s in fact

(Tr . 18 -19 ) .

the 1965 Cornet belonging to her.
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At approximately 5:30 o'clock a.m. on
the morning of April 12, 1971, Larry Hales
was awakened by his father.

(Tr. 26) .

Upon

observing that the 1965 Comet was missing, he
promptly telephoned the Spanish Fork Police
Department and the Utah Highway Patrol and
informed them of the missing automobile
(Tr. 26-27).

Later that same morning at appro-

ximately 5:40 a.m., Blair Bradford, a trooper
with the Utah Highway Patrol was proceeding
North on I-15 at approximately the Ironton
overpass in Utah County, when he saw a white
1965 Comet two-door hardtop cross the overpass
and pull onto the freeway in front of him
(Tr. 32).

Mr. Bradford, apparently suspicious

for some reason, called his dispatcher, gave
her the license number of the 1965 Comet and
asked that a registration check be made.

(Tr.33).

Bradford then decided to pull the Comet over
and radioed ahead to the Provo City Police
Department for help (Tr. 33).

The 1965 Comet

PUlled off on to the Center Street exit going
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into Provo.

Officer Bradford turned on his

lights and the Comet proceeded to pull over.
Just before stopping, however, the car pulled
away from the curb and a high speed chase
through the west side of Provo insued.

(Tr.33).

Officer Bradford was able to stop the vehicle
only by ramming its right rear fender with his
patrol car.

(Tr. 34) .

The sole occupant of

the Comet immediately jumped out of the car
and began running on foot.

When Bradford

waived his shotgun and yelled at him to stop,
he promptly did so

(Tr. 35).

Officer Bradford

identified that person as the defendant.
(Tr. 35).

The defendant was placed under arr-

est by a Provo City police officer (Tr. 35),
and was not informed of the charges against
him or of his legal rights (Tr. 41).
Although the defendant was desirous
of being represented by counsel, he did not
have any communication with any legal counsel
whatever until the day of his preliminary
hearing, at which time Don R. Peterson,
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cour~-~ppointed counsel, spoke with the defen-

dant for approximately five to ten minutes
before the preliminary hearing.

Although

the defendant had produced three witnesses
to testify in his behalf and who were all in
attendance at the hearing, Mr. Peterson
declined to call the witnesses and refused
even to consult with or interview the witnesses
who were present in the courtroom at the time,
(See affidavit of defendant on file in the
record herein) .
The defendant's court-appointed attorney
entered a plea of "not guilty" and made the
customary motion to dismiss for lack of
evidence.

The motion was denied and the

defendant was bound over for trial.
On about May 15, 1971, the courtappointed counsel came to visit the defendant
for 10 minutes in the Utah County Jail at
Which time the defendant's counsel told him
that, "Because r am court-appointed, I cannot
do too much for you, but if you can give me

7

some money, I may be better able to help you.
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(See affidavit of defendant on file in the
record herein) .

When the defendant responded

that he did not have any money, counsel then
asked him to borrow from relatives.

Defendant

told counsel relatives would not help and
counsel reiterated that he was deeply involved
in civil matters and that he did not have
much time to spend, but that if he had some
money, he could afford to put an associate
~

work on the case with him and they could

do a much better job of defense.

(See affidavit

of defendant on file in the record herein) .
The defendant told his attorney again
the names and addresses of witnesses who could
testify on his behalf and the attorney responded, "Tell them to come and see me".

The

defendant then informed his attorney of his
prior history of excessive drug abuse and
suseptibility to drug "flashback" phenomenon
and the hospital personnel who could corroborate
his medical history.

He also told his lawyer

8

of past occurrences of infectious hepatitis
and that he was again afflicted with the disease
and was seriously ill and he asked his attorney
to send a doctor to the jail to examine him
and precribe some medication since the jail
officials refused to remove him to the hospital
because he was allegedly an escape risk.
Approximately a week to ten days later
the defendant's court appointed attorney called
the defendant on the telephone at the jail
for a two minute conversation and asked him if
he would be willing to plead guilty to a lesser
offense.

The defendant refused and the

conversation terminated without any further
discussion of the case, its merits, possible
defenses or witnesses.

(See affidavit of

defendant on file in the record herein).
A few days prior to trial, the attorne
came to the jail again to have the defendant
sign an affidavit of impecuniosity.

At this

time he again told the defendant without some
money he could not expect too much.

The
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dPfendant at this time informed his attorney
that he lvas gravely ill and asked him to bring
a writ of habeas corpus in order to get him
into a hospital.

His attorney informed him

iliat such a writ would cost money.

He also

said that such writs were time consuming and
that his schedule was very busy.

(See affidavit

ot defendant on file in the record herein).
After a 30-day bout with hepatitis the
~fendant

finally persuaded one of the jailers

to have a doctor come in the jail.

A Dr. Clark

fiMlly came to the jail and affirmed the
~fundant's contention that he was suffering

from hepatitis

(from which he had suffered

severe and irreparable liver damage) .
On the morning of May 27, 1971, immediately before the trial, defendant's attorney
spoke briefly (about 30 minutes) with the
defendant and his witnesses.

This was the

first and only time defendant's lawyer had ever
Spoken to any of the defense witnesses and
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the only time he ever seriously discussed the
merits of the case and possible defenses with
the defendant.
The defense attorney made no medical
background investigation nor did he attempt
to introduce at trial any evidence as to

drug flashback interludes even though urged
to do so by the defendant, nor did he conduct
any kind of background investigation to

secure evidence to support the defendant's
explanation as to his possession of the
automobile.
When the verdict of guilty was returned
by the jury, the defendant urged his attorney

to file notice of appeal which he refused
to do; whereupon, the defense attorney promptly

requested the court to dismiss him from future
defense of the case.
The defendant, Darrell Eugene Heath,

thereafter filed his own notice of appeal and
Petitioned the court to appoint new counsel to
attempt to salvage his claim.

11

In addition to the facts pertinent to
this case, the Defendant, during the time he
was incarcerated in the County Jail, requested
his counsel to arrange for his attendance
at a divorce hearing in which he was defendant
and desired to be present and represented by
counsel; his request was totally disregarded
and ignored by his counsel.

Furthermore,

the Court-appointed counsel refused to investigate the possibility of bail in view of an
outstanding parole hold, even though he was
seriously ill with hepatitis.

(See affidavit

of defendant on file in the record herein).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S .MOTION TO DISMISS
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENTATION
OF THE STATE'S CASE.
A.

THE STATE FAILED, AS A MATTER
OF LAW, TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT
TOOK THE 1965 COMET.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section
76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953), larceny
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is defined as "the felonious stealing, taking,
carrying, leading or driving away of the personal property of another."

Section 76-38-4,

Utah Code Annotated (1953) then goes on to
define grand larceny as larceny "when the property taken is of value exceeding $50.00".
As can be seen above, one of the essential
elements of the commission of the crime of
larceny is the taking of property belonging
to another and as a result thereof, before an
individual can be convicted of larceny, it
must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did in fact take the
property.
In the instant case, the State presented

no direct evidence that the defendant took
the automobile in question.

The State pre-

sented no witnesses who either saw the defendant take the automobile; who saw the defendant in the vicinity where the automobile was
allegedly taken at or about the time it was
allegedly taken; or who testified as to any
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statements made by the defendant that he
intended to take the automobile or that he
in fact had taken it.

The only evidence

presented by the State which linked the
defendant to the alleged larceny was that he
was in possession of the vehicle in question
shortly after it was allegedly stolen.

The

rule that mere possession of recently stolen
property is insufficient evidence upon which
to base a conviction of larceny has been long
established in this state.

As early as 1889,

in the decision of People v. Swazey, 6 Utah

93, 21 P.400, the Utah Supreme Court made
this pertinent comment concerning the effect
of recent possession in a trial for larceny:
If the property had been found in
the defendant's possession immediately after loss, such possession
might have been a circumstance to
be taken into consideration by a
jury, with other circumstances,
in ariving at a conclusion as to the
guilt or innocense of the def~n~ant.
But of itself it was not sufficient.
It seems now to be an established
doctrine, especially in this western
country, that in larceny the r~cent
possession of stolen property is not
of itself sufficient to warrant a
conviction.
(21 P. at 402).
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The legislature has provided the State
with aid, however, in proving its case of
larceny if it can add an additional circumstance
to the circumstance of recent possession.
Section 76-38-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953)in
discussing proof of larceny contains

the

following pertinent language:
Possession of property recently
stolen, when the person in possession
fails to make a satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima facie
evidence of guilt.
This section permits the State to get
to the jury when there is no direct evidence
of the taking if it can show both recent possession

of stolen property by the defendant

and that the defendant had no satisfactory
explanation for his possession.

Proof of

both elements is absolutely necessary.

Perhaps

the leading case construing this statute is
State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 P.1023 (1911).

The Supreme Court reversed a lower court verdict of grand larceny based in part upon the
Presumption above-discussed.

In that case,
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the State had failed to present any direct
evidence which linked the defendant to the
alleged larceny.

In discussing what the State

had to show, therefore, in order to justify
a verdict of gui 1 ty, the court said at 119
P.1028:

There being no direct evidence of the
taking by the defendant, to indulge
the presumption or draw the inference
of the felonious taking of the property
by him, the state is required to prove
the facts of the larceny, recent
possession in the defendant, and that
he failed to satisfactorily explain
his possession.
These facts must not
themselves be left to mere inference or
presumption; they must be proved.
In explaining more fully what the statute
meant in requiring the defendant to make a
satisfactory explanation, the court said at
119 P.1037:
We think a fair meaning of the statute
is that, to make a prima facie case of
guilt, the state, in the absence of other
evidence, must show the larceny, recent
possession in the accused, and that he
failed to make a satisfactory explanation.
That is, that he, when asked about his
possession, or when called upon to explain
it, remained silent when he ought to have
spoken, or gave an untruthful account~ or
unreasonable, or improbable, explanation
of it; or gave some explanation not
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consistent with innocense.
It is also important to note that it is
the State which must show the lack of a reason-

able explanation and not the defendant which
must carry the burden of proving a reasonable
explanation.
In speaking to that very question,
the Potello

cou~t

said at 119 P.1027:

It would seem a very strained construction
of the statute to say that, when the State
had aduced proof tending to show the larceny
and recent possession in the accused, it
could rest, and then shift or cast the
burden on the accused to satisfactorily
explain his possession. To say that would
mean that the state in the first instance
was required to only prove the larceny and
recent possession in the defendant, which,
under the terms of the statute, is not a
prima facie case, and then cast the burden
on him to explain his possession, which if
done by him satisfactorily and consistent
with innocense, then the state had not made
a prima facie case.
If, however, he had
failed or was unable to make such an explanation to the satisfaction of the jury,
then the state had made a prima facie case
of guilt. That is, the question of whether
the state in the first instance and when it
rested had made a prima facie case would
depend upon the showing made by the defendant
with respect to his possession and whether
it was accounted for or explained to the
satisfaction of the jury. And hence they,
and not the court, would determine and be
the judges of whether the state had made
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a prima facie case, a doctrine violative
of al~ principles of criminal jurisprudence.
We think the statute does not mean that.
The court clearly held that the State
as part of the presentation of its case in
chief, must prove not only the larceny and
recent possession of the stolen property by
the defendant, but in addition, the failure
of the defendant to satisfactorily explain
his possession of the property.
A review of the record will quickly
reveal that the State did not meet its burden
as required in the Potello case and by Section
76-38-1.

The State made no effort whatsoever

in the presentation of its case in chief to
show that the defendant failed, when asked, to
satisfactorily explain his possession of the
automobile or that any such explanation given
by the defendant was unsatisfactory. The

record does not disclose whether or not the
officers who arrested the defendant or anyone
else thereafter ever asked him why he was in
possession of the automobile or how he came
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into such possession.

There is no evidence

that any explanation given was unsatisfactory
or inconsistent with the facts.

As noted

above, since the only evidence of taking in
this case is the defendant's recent possession
of allegedly stolen property, the State must
not only show such possession, but it must
show that the defendant failed to explain
such possession.

The record is totally devoid

of any such proof, and therefore, defendant's
motion to dismiss at the end of the State's
case should have been granted by the court.
It may be contended, however, that
since the defendant went on to voluntarily
relate to the court and jury an explanation
for his possession of the automobile as part
of the presentation of his case, the error
~s

corrected when the jury obviously rejected

his explanation.

It is of little help to the

State to say that the jury did not believe
the defendant's explanation and therefore it

Was in any event unsatisfactory and the State's
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foilure to show that in the first instance was
oot prejudicial error.

It must be emphasized

that the State has the burden of proving the

defendant gui 1 ty beyond a reasonable doubt.

rt was the State, not the defendant, who had
~e

burden of showing that such explanation

~s

unsatisfactory.

To permit a correction

of the State's error by saying that the defendant failed to prove that his explanation
was satisfactory leads directly into the trap
~ich

the Potello case warned against.

In

effect, i t shifts the burden of proving the
lack of an essential element of a crime onto
the defendant and puts off the determination
of whether the State has met its burden of
proof in making out a prima facie case until
after the defense has presented its evidence.
Such action would be entirely out of harmony
with the system of American jurisprudence.
It is not the statutory scheme and is expressly
condemned by the Potello case.
Even if the above condemned procedure
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~s

for some reason permissable, the case law

is clear that once the defendant has presented
his explanation, the State has the further
~rden

of proving that explanation false or

i~lausable

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here

again, the State failed to meet its burden.
In addition to testifying in his own behalf,
the

defendant presented the evidence of two

~ditional

witnesses --- Valorie Peterson

Anderson and Larry Merrill.

The testimony

of the defendant and these two witnesses presented direct eye witness testimony explaining
defendant's possession of the 1965 Comet autooobile.

All three consistently testified

to the following.

The three of them had

gone to the Spanish Fork Municipal Park
sometime after 12:30 a.m. on the morning of
April 12, 1971, following a party at Larry
Merrill's home.

(Tr. 56, 57, 60, 62, 76).

They had been there some time (Tr. 57) when
i

iliey saw a man lying on the lawn who appeared
to be very sick.

(Tr. 57, 63, 67-68) ·

The
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~fendant returned from talking with the man

and told the other two that he was going to

take him home.

(Tr. 63 and 68).

The defendant

t~n

proceeded to help this individual toward

s~e

parked cars on the outskirts of the park.

(Tr. 5 8 and 6 3) •

Both Mrs. Ander son and

fu, Merrill testified that they could not
~ecif ically

identify any of the parked cars

as the 1965 Comet, but both testified that

one of the parked cars fit the general description of the automobile in question.
and 63).

(Tr. 58

Mrs. Anderson also testified that

after she and Mr. Merrill left the park and
were walking back to his home, a small white
car matching the basic description of the
~hicle

in question drove past them from

ilie direction of the park.

The defendant

~stified that he helped the individual to
~e of

the parked cars and took him to a

~tel located between Provo and Springville.

(Tr. 68 and 69).

This individual gave the

~fendant permission to use the automobile in
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~der

for the defendant to get home again

with the understanding that the defendant
was to return the automobile back to the motel
ilie next morning.

(Tr. 69).

This was the

automobile in which the defendant was subsequently picked up.

(Tr. 69).

The law is clear that when the defendant
~kes

an explanation of his recent possession

of stolen property and then supports that

explanation with direct evidence, the State
~s

the burden of rebutting that evidence and

of proving the explanation false.
~do

If it fails

so, the State has not met its burden of

proof and the inference raised by Section
76-38-1 fails.
~is

The Utah Supreme Court made

very clear in State v. Converse, 40 Utah

72, 119 P.1030

(1911).

The court pointed out

that once such evidence has been presented,
the failure of the State to rebutt that evi~nce takes the case from the jury.

At 119

P.1033, the court declared that in the absence
of contrary evidence introduced by the State,
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the jury "could not be permitted to disregard
such direct evidence [of the defendant] or,

as against it, ba.se a finding of the facts
~on the mere presumption."

As a result, even

if for some reason the defendant was placed in

a position so that the burden was upon him

W satisfactorily explain away his possession
of the stolen property, his pres en ta tion of

direct evidence showing an explanation as to
why he was in possession of that property reshifted the burden back to the State to dis~ove

beyond a reasonable doubt the validity

of such explanation.

The State could not

simply rely on the hope that the jury would
disbelieve the defendant's evidence and therefor
ilsregard it.
~ints
~e

The Converse decision clearly

out that such is not the province of

jury.

The State had the burden of present-

ing at least some rebuttal evidence.

Its

failure to do so constituted a failure to meet
~

meet its burden of proof and as a result

~ereof,

the court erred in refusing to grant
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defendant's motion to dismiss when it was
again renewed at the close of the defendant's
case.
B.

THE STATE FAILED, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, TO PROVE THAT IF DEFENDANT
TOOK THE 1965 COMET, HE TOOK IT
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
OWNERS.

Assuming, for the sake of argument only,
that the State did present sufficient evidence
linking the defendant to the taking of the
vehicle to get that question before the jury,
defendant's motion to dismiss should nevertheless have been granted since the State totally
failed in its proof of another essential
element of the crime of larceny.

It has long

been held that in order to prove that the
taking by the defendant constituted "felonious
stealing" the State must show that the taking
was without the consent of the owner.

The

general rule has been well stated in 50 Am.
Jur.

2d, Larceny, §23 (1970) as follows:
The felonious or fraudulent taking of
personal property from the po~session.of
another against his will or without his
consent is essential to larceny, for a
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trespass upon his right to possession
is a characteristic of a larcenous
taki~g, and the crime is not ordinarily
committed where the property is taken with
the full knowledge and consent of the
owner or h~s authorized servant or agent,
however guilty may be the taker's intent.
The record clearly demonstrates that
although Mrs. Lillian Hales was the registered
~ner

of the 1965 Mercury Comet automobile,

~ich

is the subject of this law suit, her

son, Larry Hales, was the principal user of
the vehicle and in fact had paid for the same

and also received the proceeds from its subsequent sale.

Both the State and the lower

court recognized this beneficial ownership in
Larry Hales when the court permitted the State
~

amend the information filed herein to show

both Lillian Hales and Larry Hales as the dual
~ners

of the vehicle.

(Tr. 46-48).

As a

result, either Lillian Hales or Larry Hales
could have legally consented to the use of
llie vehicle by the defendant and the State,

in order to prove its case, had to show a
lack of consent on the part of both.

This
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~e State failed to do.

The State did illicit

testimony from Lillian Hales to the effect
~at she did not consent to the defendant's
use of the automobile.

oth~r hu.nd,

(Tr. 14-15).

On the

the State made no effort whatso-

ever to show lack of consent on the part of
~rry Hales.

The subject was not brought up

and the record is totally devoid of any
evidence upon which the jury could have made

any rational finding on that point.

Based

thereon, i t is again submitted that defendant's
motion to dismiss made at the conclusion of
~e State's case was well taken and the court

corrunitted prejudicial error in refusing to

grant said motion.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE AT THE CONCLUSION
OF THE TRIAL AND BEFORE THE CASE
WAS SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
All of the issues raised under Point I
above are equally applicable here since if
they justified dismissal of the action at the
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conclusion of the presentation of the State's
case, they certainly would still justify
dismissal when the motion was renewed prior
to submitting the case to the jury.

However,

there is a separate and independent ground for
dismissal of this action which arose after
defendant presented its case, which is equally
as persuasive for dismissal.
Another of the elements essential to
a conviction of the crime of grand larceny
is that the property be taken with the intent
to seal.

In other words, the defendant must

have taken the property with the intent to
permanently deprive the owner of possession
thereof.

Failure to prove such intent must

result in an aquittal of the defendant.

The

Utah Supreme Court has succinctly stated this
proposition in State v. Dubois, 64 Utah 433,
231 P • 6 2 5 I

62 6

( 19 2 4 ) a S f 011 OW S

:

The mere taking of personal property
belonging to another does not, of course,
constitute larceny. The taking must be
with a felonious intent to steal and this
element must be established by the circumstances of the taking or other proper proof.
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The State contended in the court below
that this felonious intent could be inferred
from the defendant's action in apparently

attempting to avoid apprehension when he sped
away from the officer reulting in a high speed
chase through the City of Provo.

(Tr. 52) .

This evidence of intent is clearly circumstantial, and is not sufficient to sustain a
!

finding that the defendant took the 1965 Comet
with the intent to steal it.

When circumstan-

tial evidence may be reasonably and rationally
explained on more than one ground, and one of
the grounds is consistent with the defendant's
innocense and inconsistent with his guilt,
then that circumstantial evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a basis
for conviction of a crime.

The general rule

has been well stated in the decision of
Cabianchi v. People, 111 Colo. 298, 141 P.2d
688

(1943).

In that case, the court reversed

a murder conviction where proof of an essential
element was based upon circumstantial evidence.
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That circumstantial evidence consisted of a
slatement claimed to have been made by the
defendant which the state claimed was incriminatory.

In examining the effect of that state-

ment, the court said at 141 P.2d 692:
The circumstance indicated by the
statement attributed to the defendant, while consistent with guilt,
is equally consistent with innocense.
There can be no question that when
such is the fact and circumstantial
evidence alone is relied upon, a
circumstance or circumstances consistent with guilt, but equally
consistent with innocense does not
constitute sufficient proof to sustain the conviction.
Furthermore, it is clear that this
determination is one for the court and not
i
1

for the jury.

In State v. Alkhowarizmi, 101

Ariz. 514, 421 P.2d 871 (1966), the Arizona
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new
trial a conviction in a sodomy case based upon
circumstantial evidence.

The defendant in the

lower court had moved for dismissal claiming
that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant.

In speaking

to that issue, the court said at 421 P.2d 872:
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In view of the fact that inconsistent
conclusions are reasonable from the
circumstances, and the conclusions
consistent with innocense are as
equally reasonable as the inference
consistent with guilt, the trial
court erred when it denied defendant's
motion to dismiss and submitted the
case to the jury.
There can be little question that these
principles are applicable today in the Utah
courts.

Our own Supreme Court made this

very clear in the decision of State v. Laub,
131 P.2d 805 (1942) when it said at 131 P.2d
807:

While the state's evidence is
circumstantial, such evidence may be
just as conclusive or even more so
than direct evidence, but the prosecution still has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty. Or
stated another way, the prosecution
must "not only show by a preponderance
of evidence that an offense was
committed, and that the alleged facts
and circumstances are true, but they
must also be such facts and circumstances as are incompatible upon any
reasonable hypothesis, with the
innocense of the accused, and
incapable of explanation upon any
reasonable hypothesis other than the
defendant's guilt".
[Ci ting cases] .
As pointed out in Underhill's
Criminal Evidence, 4th Edition, Page
21, "all the circumstances as proved
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must be consistent with each other,
and they are to be taken together as
proved.
Being consistent with each
other and taken together, they must
point surely and unharringly in the
direction of guilt .
" Hence if
two reasonable hypothesis are pointed
out by the evidence and one of them
points to the defendants' innocense,
it would then be difficult to see
how any jury can be convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt of the defendants'
guilt.
Is the defendant's apparent attempt
to flee apprehension by a police officer
consistent only with a finding that the
defendant had taken the automobile in question
with an intent to steal it and permanently
deprive the owner of possession thereof, or
are such circumstances equally consistent
with other reasonable hypothesis?

When the

defendant was questioned concerning his
apparent attempt to flee the police officer,
he presented a

perfectly reasonable and

rational explanation of his actions on a basis
other than an intent to steal the automobile.
For some period prior to the trial,
the defendant had been suffering from the

I

I
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"excessive" use of drugs.

His problem had

been characterized as a "significant one".

(R. 8).

One of the inherent problems arising

from the excessive use of drugs, especially

LSD, is what has been com_rnonly called a
"flashback" during which a person may react
in all respects as though he were under the
influence of drugs when in fact at that
moment he is not.

The defendant testified

that the reason why he failed to stop as the
officer began pulling him over with the flashing lights was because of a drug flashback in
which he in effect blacked out and could not
remember anything that occurred during the
insuing high speed chase.

(Tr. 70).

Under the circumstances of the defendant's
serious drug problem as evidenced by Dr.
Washburn's letter to Judge Sorenson of April
14, 1971 (R. 8), defendant's explanation of
his actions is perfectly plausible.

It pre-

sents a reasonable alternative hypothesis to
the inference that defendant tried to avoid
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arrest because he had in fact taken the autooobile with the intent to steal it.

As a

result, this single piece of circumstantial
~idence

pointing to defendant's intent to

steal the vehicle as a matter of law, could
not form the basis of a conviction for larceny.
The State was under the burden to present
additional evidence demonstrating either
that defendant's explanation was unreasonable
or irrational, or that it tended to independently establish this element of the crime.
The State's failure to do so constituted a
failure to carry its burden of proof and the
court should properly have granted defendant's
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the
trial.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF THE
REASONABLE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
A.

The constitutional right to the

assistance of counsel in a criminal case (U.S.
Const. 6th Amend, 14th Amend.;

see Gideon v.
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~nwright,

372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9

L.Ed 2d 799

(1963))

includes the guarantee

that such assistance be "effective".

See

Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53
S. Ct.

55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); People v.

Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 34 Cal. Reptr. 863
386 P.2d 487

(1963)

that "effective" counsel

required by due process, however, is not
erro~less

counsel; rather it is counsel

"reasonably likely to render and rendering
reasonably effective assistance".
v•

Mac Kenna

E 11 is , 2 8 0 F . 2 d 5 9 2 , 5 9 9 ( 5th Cir . 19 6 0) ,

modified, 289 F.2d 928; Brubaker v. Dickson,
310 F.2d 30, 37

(9th Cir. 1962); People v.

McDoNell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 748, 447 P.2d 97
(1968); In Re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460
P.2d 984

(1969).

Although the determination of whether
the demands of due process have been met in
1

a particular case is always "a question of
judgment and degree" to be answered in light
of all the circumstances and with the view to
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fundamental fairness".

Brubaker v. Dickson,

supra; People v. Ibarra, supra; People v.
~~~ell,

supra.

Certain general standards

have evolved for the aid of the court making
this determination.

Fundamental among these

is that which places upon counsel the duty
to conduct careful factual and legal investigation and inquiries with a view to developing matters of defense in order that he may
make informed decisions on his client's behalf,
both at the pleading stage (see

Von Motke v.

Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S. Ct. 116, 92 L.Ed.
309

(1948); In Re Williams, supra; Wilson v.

Rose, 366 F.2d 611

(9th Cir. 1966), and at the

trial Brubaker v. Dickson, supra; People v.
McDowell, supra; People v. Ibarra, supra.
If counsel's failure to undertake such
careful inquiries and investigations results
in withdrawing a crucial defense from the
caBe, the defendant has not had the assistance
to which he is entitled."
~upra;

People v. Ibarra,

In Re Williams, supra; Brubaker v.

Dickson, supra.

The above-cited language
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in appellant's argument Point III is practi-

cally a verbatim account of the Supreme
court of California's opinion in the In Re
Saunders decision, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 472 P.2d
921, 926

(1970), a case involving practically

the same issue as presented by this appeal.
In the case of Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d

30, 38-39

(9th Cir. 1962) the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that a violation of the defendant's right
to the effective representation of counsel
had been sufficiently alleged and stated:

Upon examination of the whole record,
we conclude that appellant alleged
a combination of circumstances not
refuted by the record which, if true,
precluded the presentation of his
available defenses to the court and
the jury through no fault of his own,
and thus rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Appellant does not
complain that after investigation
and research trial counsel made
decisions of tactics and strategy
injurious to appellant's cause; the
allegation is rather that trial counsel
failed to prepare, and that appellant's
defense was withheld not through dellberate through faulty judgment, but
in default of knowledge that reasonable
inquiry would have produced, and hence
in default of any judgment at all.
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The ommissions alleged by appellant
were not mistakes of counsel or error
in the course of the trial.
If true,
they constituted a total failure to
present the cause of the accused in any
fundamental respect.
Such a proceeding would not constitute for the
accused the fair trial contemplated
by the due process clause.
Id. 310
F.2d 30, 38-39.
The case presently on appeal is not
unlike the Saunders or Brubaker cases (cited
supra) with respect to the pretrial preparation of the defense attorney.

When the

demands upon an attorney's time become so allenveloping so as to preclude him from conducting an adequate pretrial investigation, interviewing of defendant's witnesses and an appropriate medical history inquiry in order
to adequately prepare his defense, he may not
be said to have rendered the defendant the

adequate and effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the 6th amendment.

(See Powell

v. Alabama, supra; People v. Ibarra, supra;

In Re Saunders, supra.

Although the in-
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efficiency of counsel may not be raised when
the defendant has retained his own private
attorney, he should not be held responsible
for inefficiency of court-appointed counsel
(See Darcey v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407

(3 Cir.

1953) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1954);
Lotz v. Saers, 292 F.2d 657

(6th Cir.);

Popeko v. U.S., 294 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.);
Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.).
Perhaps no single incident in this case would
justify a finding of "inadequate or ineffective"
assistance of counsel but the totality of
events and the representation as a whole, as
can be determined by a reading of both the
defendant's affidavit (on file in the record
herein) and the record of the trial, do clearly
indicate the defendant was inadequately and
ineffectively represented.

The importance of

the record is not so much what the record
contains, but what is conspicuously absent by
way of defense in the record of the trial.
To permit the defendant's conviction
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for a felony with representation so lacking

in investigation and preparation as to render
the defendant's counsel's performance a
perfunctory formality, of all form and no
substance, so as to render the trial itself a
farse and a sham, is not only in violation
of the 6th amendment and the mandate of
Gideon v. Wainwright, but is totally antithetical to traditional notions of Anglo
American jurisprudence.
B.

The defendant court-appointed

counsel's failure to aduce medical evidence
was sufficient by itself to render his defense
unconstitutionally inadequate.
One of the crucial elements of the
crime of grand larceny is the "intent to
permanently deprive the owner of his property".
The only evidence the State introduced to
support this essential element was the fact
that when the state highway patrolman turned
on his flashing red lights and attempted to
pull the defendant over to the curb, the
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defendant at first slowed down then took off

and a high speed chase insued.

The defendant

repeatedly informed his counsel of his former
~ug

problem and suseptibility to the drug

"flashback" phenomenon.

Al though he informed

his counsel of medical personnel at the State
Hospital where he had been a patient who could
verify and coroberate his testimony, the
attorney not only failed to investigate this
defense, but he made no attempt to assert it
at trial.

As to the substantiality and medical

validity of the policeman's flashing red lights
as inducing petit mal epileptic seizure, see
, Photic Driving; Clinical Neurology P.146

(1964);

for the effect of flashing lights on long term
LSD

users, see Van Deusen & Metzer, The Long

Term Effect of Psychodilics, I Clinical
Toxicology P.227-234

(1968)

It is practically common knowledge to
medical personnel experienced in the study of
psycholedic users that flashing red lights
often cause gross confusion to the former
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LSD

user, and has even been known to induce

the flashback phenomenon,

yet such medical

evidence was not even offered at trial.
The Supreme Court of California, in
In Re Saunders, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 472 P.2d

921 (1970) was presented with the question

of failure to introduce evidence of the
defendant's prior medical history of brain
dysfunction.

In that case the court stated:

In view of the matter established
by record in habeas corpus proceeding
showing that counsel at some time
prior to defendant's murder trial
decided to withhold the issue of defendant's diminished capacity from the
trial without the benefit of substantial
factual inquiry into specifics of
defendant's medical condition, notwithstanding that counsel knew defendant
has sustained head injuries which
resulted in organic brain damage.
Defendant was deprived of his right to
effective assistance of counsel [Conviction reversed] [Emphasis added] .
Id. at P. 922.
It is the contention of the appellant
i that in this case as in the Saunders case

counsel's failure to adduce at trial medical
evidence of organic brain dysfunction which
Was repeatedly brought to the attention of
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counsel (such evidence going to the essential
issue of intent and which in itself constitutes
a substantial defense) then such failure by
itself constitutes inadequate and ineffective
assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
In summary, since the State failed in its
~rden

of putting on a prima facie case against

the defendant proving grand larceny in that
they produced no evidence to refute or rebut
defendant's explanation of the recent possession, the case should not have been submitted to the jury, but rather the court
, should have granted defendant's motion to
dismiss at the conclusion of State's case.
To hold otherwise would shift the burden of
·proof to the defendant.
Secondly, the State failed, as a matter
of law, to prove the corpus delicti in that
no evidence was introduced whatever that the
true owner of the vehicle, Larry Hales, did
not give permission to use the vehicle.
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Therefore, as a matter of law, the State did
not prove a crime had been committed.
Third, the defendant's court-appointed
counsel's failure in making any investigation

or inquiring into the facts of the case, his
failure to interview defense witnesses until
20 minutes prior to trial, and his failure to
introduce extremely significant medical history,
evidence which in itself constitutes a major
defense, evidences a total lack of preparation
on the part of defendant's counsel sufficient

to warrant a finding of inadequate and ineffective representation of the defendant's
case.
For the above-stated reasons, the
defendant respectfully requests that the
conviction be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
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